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An Outsider’s View of Dassonville and
Cassis de Dijon: On Interpretation and
Policy
DONALD H REGAN*

My interest in the EC law on free movement of goods is long-standing and more than
casual, but much less than scholarly. So I am delighted to contribute some remarks
without pretending to expertise.

Copyright © 2010. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. All rights reserved.

On Interpretation
Dassonville purports to interpret the Treaty of Rome. As interpretation, it has always
seemed to me obtuse, or tendentious—or both—whether the Treaty is viewed as a treaty
or as a constitution. The Court could have saved itself a lot of grief, and the volte-face of
Keck and Mithouard, with a more thoughtful analysis at the start.
In Dassonville, the Court simply announces that all measures that have any tendency to
reduce imports are ‘measures having equivalent effect’ to quantitative restrictions.110 The
implicit argument seems to be: ‘Quantitative restrictions reduce imports. Therefore any
sort of measure that reduces imports has “equivalent effect”.’ This is a bad argument. There
are many ways to describe the effects of traditional quantitative restrictions (embargoes
and quotas). They do reduce imports. More particularly, they reduce imports without
reducing domestic production or sales. More particularly still, they reduce imports,
without reducing domestic production or sales, and their form is such as to ground a
(rebuttable) presumption that they are not justified by any positive effects they may have
on domestic non-economic values. We now have three descriptions of quantitative
restrictions in terms of their effects. Which should the Court choose? The third, the most
complete. The Court is going to condemn (presumptively) any measure whose effects fall
within its chosen description of quantitative restrictions. So the description it chooses
should be complete enough to explain why quantitative restrictions themselves are
condemned (presumptively). The description the Court chooses in Dassonville fails this
test. Only the third description passes this test. And even though it covers many fewer
110
Procureur du Roi v Dassonville (Case 8/74) [1974] ECR 837, para 5. I ignore para 6, as many others have,
including the Court. Even if para 6 tempers the rule of para 5 by saying that ‘reasonable’ measures will be
allowed, that does nothing to limit the extraordinary range of measures that para 5 says courts will review for
reasonableness.
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measures than Dassonville, the third description still encompasses not only border
measures other than core quantitative restrictions (which Articles 31 and 32 of the Treaty
of Rome, now repealed, suggest were probably the main thing the drafters were thinking
about), but also facially discriminatory internal measures (which they may have been
thinking about, with GATT Article III in mind), and arguably even the sort of facially
neutral measures on products/packaging/labeling covered by Cassis de Dijon.
In defence of Dassonville, one might argue that Dassonville and Keck were both right
when they were decided, at least as policy, since the Single European Act intervened,
creating a more effective legislator. But my argument below suggests that Dassonville was
bad policy as well as bad interpretation, even when it was decided.111 Alternatively, one
might argue that it was necessary for the Court to state an extreme view in Dassonville,
even if it would prove untenable in the long run, in order to get the attention of national
regulators and also of private enterprises, who needed encouragement to challenge
trade-reducing regulation (they certainly took the bait!).112 But just announcing the
narrower rule of Cassis de Dijon in 1974 would have got regulators’ attention and
encouraged private challenges, and it would have been much more defensible as interpretation, as well as maintainable over time.113
In the next paragraph I shall explain why the result in Cassis is more defensible than
Dassonville as a reading of Article 28(30). But even if the result in Cassis is more
defensible, the opinion is still very disappointing. The crucial paragraph 8 begins by saying
that in the absence of harmonisation, ‘it is for the Member States to regulate all matters
relating to’ alcohol, and ‘obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from
disparities between the national laws [on marketing alcohol] must be accepted,’ . . . and
then it takes it back, saying regulations are acceptable only if the Court approves their goal
and confirms their necessity.114 The Court offers no explanation of how such broad
powers of review flow from Article 28(30). It offers only an ipse dixit cloaked in rhetorical
prevarication.
How might one argue that the regulations covered by Cassis, when they exclude foreign
goods, should be presumed on the basis of their form to be unjustified (thus making them
‘equivalent’ to quantitative restrictions)? The argument has to be cobbled together from
claims that are partly explicit and partly only implicit in the Court’s discussion after
paragraph 8. The argument is that if goods are allowed to be marketed in one Member
State, then they are unlikely to present any serious problems with health, or safety, or the
like, and any other problems about consumer awareness that arise if the goods are
marketed in another Member State can be dealt with by labelling. So we can presume that

111

See especially note 131 below.
The point about the need to encourage private parties to challenge regulation was suggested to me by
Miguel Maduro.
113
Just a few years before Dassonville, the United States Supreme Court announced an equally broad
constitutional rule without the backing of any constitutional provision that explicitly limits state powers of
economic regulation: Pike v Bruce Church, Inc, 397 US 137 (1970). But the Pike test was offered as a summary of
more than a century of cases, and the old cases that established the ‘dormant commerce clause’ were arguably
better grounded in the interpretive tradition of their day than Dassonville in 1974. In any event, by 1970 the
Supreme Court’s practice was much narrower than what Pike described, and it had been for decades, and it
continued so after Pike. D Regan, ‘The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause’ (1986) 84 Michigan Law Review 1091–1287.
114
Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) (Case 120/78) [1979]
ECR 649, para 8.
112
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a flat exclusion from the other Member State is not justified; it is unnecessarily restrictive.
I do not find this wholly convincing. I wonder whether the Member States are sufficiently
homogeneous in their risk-preferences about health, safety, and the environment so that a
presumption of equivalence is justified. In addition, I think the Court may be too cavalier
in its argument about labelling. The Court ignores the fact that consumers often do not
read labels, and the equally important fact that if they did study the labels of everything
they buy, this could become a serious inconvenience.115 The Court favours German
consumers who want more choice, at the expense of others who want less choice and
easier shopping. Normally, it is the province of the German government to say which
group should prevail.116
Commentators often defend Cassis by arguments about ‘double burdens’ or discriminatory effect. The Court does not make these arguments, and rightly not. The Court
recognises that low-alcohol cassis and high-alcohol cassis are genuinely different products
(although it thinks any problem caused by the difference can be dealt with by labelling),
and it appears to recognise implicitly that when the products are different, then the mere
fact that some regulation affects them differently does not make that regulation discriminatory in any objectionable sense. To ground the claim that different treatment amounts
to discrimination, we must argue that the products are in relevant respects the same. One
way to do this is by finding protectionist purpose, which reveals that the regulating
country itself sees no genuine regulatory distinction.117 Alternatively, it can be done
directly by establishing (or asserting empirical grounds for presuming) that the foreign
product is equivalent to the local product in respect of the regulatory concern. But notice
that if the foreign product is equivalent, then a regulation that excludes it is more
restrictive than necessary, and this is a completely sufficient objection to the regulation,
without regard to whether the regulation has discriminatory effect. So in the end,
discriminatory effect plays no role (as the Cassis Court seems to have recognised), except
as evidence that would be relevant to an inquiry into regulatory purpose.118
One final point. To this outsider, it seems the Community institutions have made a
fetish of the idea that a product marketed anywhere in the Community ought to be
marketable everywhere. In its Communication concerning Cassis, the Commission
appears to say that it will proceed against national regulations that are illegal under Cassis,

115
For an excellent discussion, see H-C von Heydebrand u.d. Lasa, ‘Free Movement of Foodstuffs, Consumer
Protection and Food Standards in the European Community: Has the Court of Justice Got It Wrong?’ (1991) 16
EL Rev 391–415.
116
But don’t we need the Court to protect French producer interests, the reader may ask. I shall explain why,
counterintuitively, only German interests need be considered—but why the Court might still be right to
intervene.
117
Many people dislike purpose review. Some would say ‘equivalent effect’ in Article 28(30) was designed to
exclude purpose review, although I doubt that. But the text makes it clear that considering purpose is an essential
aspect of an ‘effects’ review that extends to discriminatory effect from facially neutral measures. See also note 122
below.
118
Under the Cassis approach, it may seem that discriminatory effect does play a role; it may seem that we are
inferring unnecessary restrictiveness from discriminatory effect, since we are inferring unnecessary restrictiveness from the fact that goods that are allowed to be sold abroad (which our suggested justification for Cassis
presumes on empirical grounds to be equivalent) are being excluded, and that sounds like discrimination. But
there is not necessarily any discrimination, even in effect; it might be that other foreign goods are still admitted,
and that local producers who would like to produce to the foreign standard are being prevented, and that there is
no net effect on foreign versus domestic market shares. All that matters is the presumption of equivalence (that
is, the presumption that the foreign good satisfies the domestic regulatory concern) based on the fact that the
goods are allowed abroad. No proposition about comparative treatment plays any essential role.
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and that where national regulations are legal under Cassis but still exclude goods from
another Member State, this problem must be dealt with by harmonisation.119 But what is
the problem harmonisation solves, unless it is assumed that the totally unimpeded
circulation of every product marketed anywhere in the Community is more important
than allowing different Members to have justifiably different standards? If the ‘single
market’ requires such totally unimpeded circulation, we should not want a fully perfected
single market.120

Copyright © 2010. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. All rights reserved.

On Policy
In his famous opinion in Leclerc-Siplec, Advocate General Jacobs says ‘the central concern
of the Treaty provisions on the free movement of goods is to prevent unjustified obstacles
to trade between Member States’.121 Taking this as a starting point for analysis, the next
question is, what does ‘justification’ mean here, and what should it mean? I shall develop a
thesis about what it should mean, but let me start with a specific question about what it
does mean that has long puzzled me: what is the role of ‘proportionality’ in EC free
movement doctrine?
Abstract discussions of ‘proportionality’ in EU law always describe a three-part test: (1)
Does the regulation contribute to the achievement of some legitimate purpose?122 (2) Is
there is any alternative way to achieve the purpose to the same degree with less damage to
whatever Community value(s) the regulation threatens? (3) Even if the regulation is the
least-damaging way to achieve whatever it achieves, is it worth it? Does the national
benefit outweigh the damage to the relevant Community value(s)?123 Now, it is clear that
in some areas of EU law, all three questions get considered. What is not clear to me is the
role of the third question, sometimes referred to as ‘proportionality in the strict sense’, in
the law of free movement of goods. In many free movement cases, a ‘proportionality’ test
is stated explicitly, but only the first two questions are mentioned; and yet there are some
cases that seem hard to explain except by reference to the third question.124 Many sources
seem thoroughly ambivalent. Consider the following paragraph from Stoke-on-Trent:
119
Commission Communication, 3 October 1980 [1980] OJ C256/2; and see Craig and De Búrca, EU Law:
Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998) 639.
120
The United States, often mentioned as a model, is not a single market in this sense. Incidentally, on
economies of scale, see note 141 below.
121
Société d’Importation Edouard Leclerc-Siplec v TFI Publicité & M6 Publicité (Case C-412/93) [1995] ECR
I-179 at I-194.
122
Note that this question requires ascertaining the regulator’s actual purpose, unless we are prepared to
justify a regulation by reference to a purpose that is asserted hypocritically. I should also mention Cassis’s second
major innovation, ‘mandatory requirements’. Some such tinkering with the Treaty text is unavoidable once we
expand Article 28(30) beyond border measures and facially discriminatory internal measures, but it follows from
the argument in the rest of this essay that the Court should have offered a negative list of illegitimate purposes
rather than embarking on a positive listing of approved purposes. In practice, it may not have made any
difference.
123
Eg G de Búrca, ‘The Principle of Proportionality and Its Application in EC Law’ (1994) Yearbook of
European Law 1993, 105–50, 113; F Jacobs, ‘Recent Developments in the Principle of Proportionality in European
Community Law’ in E Ellis (ed), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Oxford, Hart Publishing,
1999), 1–21 at 1.
124
Eg, the holding on non-approved bottles in Commission v Denmark (Case 302/86) [1988] ECR 4607.
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Appraising the proportionality of national rules which pursue a legitimate aim under Community law involves weighing the national interest in attaining that aim against the Community
interest in ensuring the free movement of goods. In that regard, in order to verify that the
restrictive effects on intra-Community trade of the rules at issue do not exceed what is necessary
to achieve the aim in view, it must be considered whether those effects are direct, indirect or
purely speculative and whether those effects do not impede the marketing of imported products
more than the marketing of national products.125

The metaphor of ‘weighing’ in the first sentence suggests a comparison of the value or
importance of the national benefit with the value or importance of the Community cost, a
comparison required only in connection with proportionality in the strict sense.126 And
yet, the second sentence of the quoted paragraph, with its focus on what is ‘necessary’ to
achieve the aim, seems to contemplate only the second question and its less-restrictivealternative inquiry.
If it is unclear whether courts actually ask the third question in movement-of-goods
cases, should they ask it? Here the answer is clear. There is no need to worry about
proportionality in the strict sense, no need to balance national interests against foreign
interests. (So those movement of goods cases that do not ask the third question have got
the theory right.) The reason is that, in the present context, regulation that optimises over
all affected domestic interests (regulation that is ‘domestically rational’, as I shall say) also
optimises over the interests of the Community as a whole (it is ‘globally efficient’). In a
nutshell: domestically rational regulation is globally efficient.127
I shall explain in a moment why the thesis just stated is true. Let me first explain why it
is important, including why it makes the test of proportionality in the strict sense
unnecessary.128 First, the thesis entails that even if the goal of Article 28(30) is to eliminate
national regulation that is economically inefficient from the Community perspective, it
suffices to eliminate regulation that is irrational from the point of view of the enacting
country.129 Since foreign interests as such do not figure into the definition of the national
interest, or of domestic rationality, there is simply no need for courts to attend to foreign
interests. In particular, there is no need to balance foreign harms against local benefits
under ‘proportionality in the strict sense’. Notice that this argument does not undercut the
‘less restrictive alternative’ test. We often speak as if the point of that test is to prevent
unnecessary harm to foreign interests, but in fact unnecessarily trade-restrictive measures

125

Stoke-on-Trent CC v B & Q plc (Case C-169/91) [1992] ECR I-6635, para 15.
A less-restrictive-alternative inquiry involves no comparison between benefit and cost, but only a
comparison of the costs of different measures that would achieve the benefit. See D Regan, ‘The Meaning of
“Necessary” in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing’ (2007) 6 World
Trade Review, 3, 347−69.
127
I am employing here the standard notion of economic efficiency (but remember that efficiency is about
satisfying preferences, not just maximising production). The EU has always had non-economic goals as well as
economic. But I assume that what the provisions on free movement of goods are currently thought to aim at
directly is economic efficiency. Note that even to the extent we might want to entangle the Members’ economies
for non-economic reasons, we will achieve most, if not all, of the desirable entanglement if we just eliminate
economically inefficient regulation.
128
For a much fuller discussion of why the thesis is true and important, and of all the topics discussed in the
remainder of this essay, see D Regan, ‘What Are Trade Agreements For? – Two Conflicting Stories Told by
Economists, With a Lesson for Lawyers’, (2006) 9 Journal of International Economic Law 4, 951–88.
129
This is true regardless of our definition of the national interest (national welfare), provided we define the
national interest the same way when we are thinking about global efficiency as when we are thinking about
domestic rationality.
126
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also damage unnecessarily the interests of locals who would like to engage in trade but are
prevented; such measures are domestically irrational.130
Second, if the real question about a measure is whether it is domestically rational, we
should generally presume that the local political/regulatory process is more likely to make
right choices than transnational courts. That is not to say the national institutions are
always right. Producer interests tend to have exaggerated political influence, leading to
purposeful protectionism, which is normally domestically irrational. The regulatory
process may sometimes rely on inadequate science. And so on. The crucial question for the
Court then becomes: what kinds of political/regulatory failure (remember, failure with
regard to domestic interests) can it and the rest of the judicial system recognise sufficiently
reliably so that they should intervene? And how should the intervention be structured so
as to interfere as little as possible with desirable national regulation?131
I have no space to discuss further what rules are best, except to note that the answer will
presumably be specific to the European Communities in some respects. Here are two
possible examples. First, Miguel Maduro has argued in defence of Cassis that national
regulation of products and packaging, even if not motivated by protectionism either
historically or in the present maintenance of old laws, has often ‘frozen’ the market so that
consumers are unaware of the potential benefits of access to foreign products. This can be
viewed as a sort of malfunction of the political process; consumers are systematically
unaware of how laws affect their own interests.132 This is the best argument I know of for
the approach of Cassis, and it has special plausibility in the EC context.
Second, I have been told that these days the ECJ often finds a national regulation in
violation of Article 28(30) and then leaves it to the referring national court to decide
whether there is an exception under Article 30(36) (and that the national courts do not
consider proportionality in the strict sense). This is an option that is not available in all
systems, and it makes excellent institutional sense once we understand that the real issue is
domestic rationality, at least if we trust the national courts. National courts are much
better positioned than the ECJ to review national regulation for domestic rationality,
perhaps even with a smaller margin of appreciation for the regulator than a transnational
court should allow. In effect, the contribution of European law is to identify cases in which
the national courts must undertake serious review, whether or not they would do so under
national law, and with the Community watching.
So finally, why is it true that domestically rational regulation is globally efficient? The
short answer is that if we make a number of reasonable assumptions, this thesis is a
mathematical theorem. I cannot offer a formal proof here.133 I shall offer two quick
130
There is a mild paradox in my view. I acknowledge that the only reason we have trade agreements is to
protect foreign interests, in the following sense: there would be no trade agreements if national regulation did not
affect foreign interests. But there is no inconsistency between that and my claim that when it comes to
ascertaining precisely what national regulations have unjustified (inefficient) foreign effects and should be
suppressed, it turns out that it is only regulations that are domestically irrational. So the test for justification can
ignore foreign interests.
131
Incidentally, since there is no need to balance or reconcile foreign interests with domestic, the existence or
non-existence of an effective transnational legislature makes less difference than one might initially assume to
what the Court should do.
132
Personal conversation, and see M Maduro, ‘Market Integration Through Law—The Law of Free Movement in the EU and the US’ in D Halberstam and M Maduro (eds), People, Power, and Politics: Comparing
Constitutionalism in the EU and US (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
133
The basic theorem, in the tariff context, and stated in different terms, is proved in Kyle Bagwell and Robert
W Staiger, ‘An Economic Theory of GATT’ (1999) 89 American Economic Review 1, 215–48 at 222–3.
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intuitive explanations. But first I need to introduce the two assumptions that are most
critical to an intuitive understanding. First, it must be true (as it is in the movement of
goods context) that the foreign effects of any challenged regulation are all mediated by the
grant or denial of market opportunities.134 My thesis has no application to environmental
law, for example, where our concern is with physical cross-border effects of national
regulation or non-regulation.135 Nor does it apply when a regulation is challenged on
individual rights principles, where the issue is not efficiency or cross-border effects at all.
Second, I assume countries do not purposefully exploit their market power vis-à-vis
other countries. What do I mean by ‘exploiting market power’? Roughly speaking, I mean
adopting a regulation in part for the reason that some of the cost of achieving the
regulation’s domestic benefits will be borne by foreign interests. I emphasise that whether
there is market power exploitation in this sense depends on the motivation for the
regulation. Almost anything a large country does will have effects abroad; often it will
impose costs abroad. But the mere fact of harmful effects abroad gives us no reason at all to
think the regulation is inefficient (even globally, from the point of view of the world as a
whole), if it is not motivated to any extent by the fact that some of the costs are borne by
foreigners. In the absence of exploitive motivation (which can be formally modelled by
various assumptions about the regulator’s objective function), regulation that is rational
from the point of view of domestic national welfare is also globally efficient. That is what
our theorem tells us.136 Many readers may find it counterintuitive that motivation is so
central for determining whether a measure is or is not globally efficient. But it is.137
Let us have some examples. The locus classicus for thinking about exploitation of market
power is the tariff. A traditional ‘optimum tariff ’ is exploitive in our sense. It uses market
power to drive down the price foreign producers can charge for their exports. It is a tax on
imports that is imposed precisely because part of the revenue raised by the tax comes
ultimately from foreign producers. In contrast, a tariff motivated solely by protectionism
(that is, by the desire to improve the lot of domestic import-competing producers), is not
exploitive in our sense. It may be natural to think of the protectionist tariff as an attempt
to help domestic producers at the expense of foreign producers, but in fact, the harm to
foreign producers is no part of what is aimed at, neither as the ultimate goal nor even as a
necessary means. That becomes clear if we remember that even a country with no market
power can pursue a policy of protectionism. Since a tariff adopted by a country with no
market power has no effect outside that country, the goal of protectionism must be
understandable in purely domestic terms (most naturally as securing some target price for
domestic producers). Hence even when there is market power and harm to foreign
134
With regard to the other three of the ‘four freedoms’, the thesis does not apply to cases on the movement
of persons; it will apply to some services cases and capital cases and not to others. The issue is always the nature
of the cross-border effects.
135
But notice that cases like the Danish bottle cases, which are ‘environmental’ cases in some general sense,
are covered by the thesis: Denmark’s regulation, which was the subject of the challenge, affected other countries
only by the grant or denial of market access.
136
As noted above (note 129), the theorem is true on any definition of national welfare, so long as we define
national welfare the same way when we ask about domestic rationality and about global efficiency: if the
regulation is domestically rational, it is globally efficient. Of course, how we define national welfare will matter
greatly to whether the antecedent in the conditional statement just presented is true (and thus to whether the
consequent is true as well); but that is another matter.
137
The reader may think that motivation cannot matter ultimately, because efficiency is about effects. Well,
yes and no. Efficiency is about satisfying preferences; so it is about effects as they are valued. Motivation is central
because (rational) regulatory purpose reflects social valuation.
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producers, the foreign harm from a protectionist tariff is merely incidental to the
protectionist project. And what our theorem tells us is that while an exploitive ‘optimum
tariff ’ is both domestically rational and globally inefficient, a tariff motivated solely by
protectionism cannot be both domestically rational and globally inefficient (even if the
country has market power). The protectionist tariff can be domestically rational or not;138
it can be globally efficient or not; but the two dimensions are logically linked. If it is
domestically rational, it is also globally efficient.
So much for market power exploitation in the tariff context. What is market power
exploitation in the context of setting facially neutral product standards, which is our main
concern in this Chapter? In this context, a country exploits market power when it sets an
inefficiently high standard precisely because some of the cost of securing the domestic
benefit from the standard will be borne by foreign producers.139 Such a policy will be
domestically rational but globally inefficient. But if the regulator does not think about
whether producers are local or foreign – if it just tries to set an efficient standard – then
there is no market power exploitation. Even though the standard imposes costs on foreign
producers, regulation that is domestically rational will be globally efficient. It is an
empirical question, of course, whether countries engage in market power exploitation in
general, and whether they engage in it in the specific context of setting product standards.
My own view is that there is very little empirical evidence of market power exploitation in
any context, even tariff-setting, and even less in the context of setting product standards.140 This much we can say with certainty: a regulation that has the effect of excluding
foreign producers from the domestic market entirely, which is the situation in many or
most cases in the Cassis line, cannot be market power exploitation. No domestic benefit
from the higher standard is being secured at foreign producers’ expense if foreign
producers do not bother to meet the standard at all.141
Now finally, the two intuitive explanations for the thesis (not competing explanations,
just different approaches): (1) If countries do not purposefully exploit market power as
importers, then domestically rational regulation will be designed to correct market failures

138
The reader may remember from some introduction to international economics that protectionism is
domestically irrational. This claim depends on taking a particular perspective on national welfare. In some trade
models, protectionism is viewed as domestically rational (hence globally efficient, hence not something a trade
agreement should try to suppress). Lest the reader doubt, my own view is that protectionism is generally
domestically irrational (and globally inefficient), and that suppressing protectionism is the principal task of
judicial review in this area.
139
An inefficiently high standard is a standard whose cost to producers (wherever located) is greater than the
benefit to the consumers or the victims of an externality. Notice incidentally that an ‘inefficiently high standard’
is not the same thing as ‘a higher standard than would be set if all producers were domestic’. If all producers are
domestic, the excessive political influence of producer groups is likely to lead to an inefficiently low standard.
Ironically, some of the producers’ being foreign, and having less political influence, may be just what is needed to
achieve an efficient standard. But that is not market power exploitation.
140
My view contradicts a central assumption of the standard formal theory of trade agreements; but I have
argued elsewhere that the standard assumption is based more on the needs of the standard model than on
empirical evidence. See Regan, ‘What Are Trade Agreements For?’, note 128 above, at 969–82.
141
The other assumptions that make my thesis a theorem (aside from purely technical mathematical
assumptions) are competitive domestic markets and constant returns to scale. These assumptions are idealisations, but they are standard in much of trade theory. More importantly, it seems particularly undesirable for
courts to try to decide case-by-case how the results in movement-of-goods cases should reflect imperfect
competition or possible economies of scale. Economies of scale are mentioned so often as a reason for wanting a
single market that I should point out that substantial economies of scale will be made possible (probably all or
almost all of what is desirable), if we merely eliminate national regulation that is inefficient even without regard
to scale economies. We do not need courts to think about scale economies in order to achieve them.
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in the domestic economy (including consumers’ ignoring domestic externalities imposed
by goods they buy from abroad). Such regulation guarantees that the national demand
curve for imports correctly reflects all affected domestic interests. If the exporting
country’s (non-exploitive) supply curve similarly reflects all interests in that country, then,
given that there are no physical cross-border externalities, the international price mechanism will generate an efficient result, just as it does in a competitive domestic market. (2)
Alternatively: foreign producers are not harmed by a regulation unless there are domestic
consumers who would deal with them but are prevented from doing so. But if there are
such consumers, they are also harmed by the regulation. So domestic consumers will end
up representing the foreign producers in the domestic political process (effectively or not,
according to how well they represent themselves). I am not saying the interests of the
consumers and the producers are identical. The interests are distinct, and if there is
inefficient regulation, the total loss is the sum of the losses to consumers and producers.
Still, absent market power exploitation, there can be no inefficiency-based loss to foreign
producers without corresponding inefficiency-based loss to domestic consumers. Hence, if
we eliminate the inefficiency-based loss to domestic consumers, we necessarily eliminate
the inefficiency-based loss to foreign producers as well (not all the loss from regulation,
but the inefficiency-based loss). In other words, domestically rational regulation is
globally efficient.
In formulating movement-of-goods doctrine, the Court should be asking how courts
can best restrain national regulation that is domestically irrational, while allowing
regulation that is domestically rational. How well the Court is doing I leave it to EU
scholars to say.
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